From Pact to Bloodshed: How Protest-Movement Structures Shaped Two Ukraine's Revolutions

Journal:	*Europe-Asia Studies*
Manuscript ID	CEAS-2025-0145
Manuscript Type:	Article
Keywords:	Ukraine, pacted transition, negotiated transition, protests, revolution, Maidan

From Pact to Bloodshed: How Protest-Movement Structures Shaped Two Ukraine's Revolutions

This article compares the attempts at negotiations between the elites and the opposition during the two Ukrainian revolutions, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the Euromaidan of 2014. It investigates why Ukraine, which already had a successful pacted transition with the same leader and group of actors in 2004, failed to reproduce similar result in 2014. This article claims that the Maidan 2004 movement had a vertical, hierarchical structure that enabled credible commitment, whereas the sporadic, decentralized nature of the Euromaidan revolution paid lip service when it came to the negotiations with the government.

Keywords: Ukraine, pacted transition, negotiated transition, Maidan, Orange Revolution, protests, revolution, electoral revolution

Word count 10540.

Introduction

This paper compares two attempts at pacted transitions in Ukraine—those of 2004 and 2014—when mass protests in Kyiv's *Maidan Nezaleznosti* forced the same pivotal figure, Victor Yanukovych, first a presidential candidate and later the sitting president, to the brink of resignation. Both crises unfolded within the same society and among overlapping generations of leaders, and each prompted formally announced negotiations that brought together Ukrainian elites with representatives of the European Union and Russia, ultimately

producing agreements intended to defuse the standoffs. In both cases, the political leaders had finally reached certain agreements. Yet, the attempts at negotiations between almost the same group of people ended very differently.

In this paper, I claim that this difference lies in the ways the two revolutions came about and were organized. The protests in 2004 were triggered by the contested elections that were known to take place long in advance, while those of 2014 erupted spontaneously because Yanukovych decided to abandon the association agreement with the EU at the last moment. Therefore, in 2004, the protests were organized in a top-down way inherent to the electoral revolutions (Levitsky and Lucan A Way, 2010). The core organizational structure of the 2004 Orange Revolution was the party of Yushchenko, the leader of the opposition. Therefore, the protest movement had a hierarchical character and was controlled by a single leader. The Euromaidan of 2013-2014 emerged as a series of sporadic protests.

This episode became particularly important because the uncooperative character of that transition triggered an obviously exaggerated reaction from Russia`s Vladimir Putin, who somehow perceived it as an existential threat. Following the events of these days, Putin has started a Russo-Ukrainian war (Kudelia and others, 2013) in Crimea and Donbas in the same year and finished with the ongoing ruthless full-scale invasion in 2022.

The pair of Ukrainian cases in 2004 and 2014 has particular analytical importance because, while the attempts at negotiations have different outcomes, almost every other societal characteristic that is known to predict the mode of regime change and subsequent democratization was similar. Hence, Ukraine`s chances of at pacted transition to democracy in both cases were mostly dependent on the choices of actors, but they seemed to behave cooperatively in both cases.

It was a difference in the structure of protest movements that explains the different outcomes of negotiations and modes of regime change. This case study aims to demonstrate how

Yushchenko's capacity to control the non-violent protest in 2004 was crucial for the successful pacting, in line with findings that structured movements with hierarchical leadership increase pacting feasibility (Iakovlev, 2022; Zelinska, 2023). On the other hand, the decentralized, often non-hierarchical structure of the 2014 protest undermined its capacity to negotiate with the incumbent.

This paper is organized as follows. First, I overview the theories on democratization and modes of regime change, the legacy the pacts created in the past, and the preconditions they require. I show the instruments to access the capacity of opposition organizations. Second, I discuss the dependent variable – the success of negotiations. Third, I discuss the initial regimes in both cases and show that the Ukrainian regimes in 2004 and 2014 are what Levitsky and Way (2010) call "competitive authoritarianism". Fourth, I show my independent variable – the organizational structure of the opposition movements, and describe how the two revolutions were organized. The second half of the paper tells the stories of the two Maidans in chronological order. I trace how the well-known 2004 Orange revolution emerged; how it led to negotiations; and how the negotiations ended. Then, I briefly describe the Ukrainian democratic backslide between the two transitions. Then, I similarly trace the 2014 revolution. In the conclusion, I summarize various reasons that explain the outcome and relate it to the theories on modes of regime change (O'Donnell *et al.*, 1986).

Theory

Ukraine`s preconditions for democracy

The way the political regime is changed, that is, the choices the actors make and the way they cooperate, is the most decisive for democratization in countries like Ukraine. The reason is that the political regimes in middle-income countries are not as structurally pre-determined as

they are in utterly poor or rich societies (Boix and Stokes, 2003).

Modernization theory holds that rising urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, and changing class structures foster democratization (Lipset, 1959; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Przeworski, 1999; Vanhanen, 2003; Boix, 2011). The pattern explains most very poor or very wealthy states but is less predictive for middle-income countries. For instance, Inglehart (2018) links democracy to cohorts raised in material security and self-expression values, yet Ukraine scores similarly to both democracies and autocracies.

The theories that focus on exogenous factors also do not predict its political regime. For instance, Levitsky and Way (2010) explain countries` political regimes with linkages – horizontal economic and civil connections between the countries. The ties with democracies make a country more democratic – and vice-versa. According to them, Ukraine`s linkages to the democratic West existed but were weak (2010, p. 214).[1] Jang (2024) argues that states used to be deeply integrated in USSR—like Ukraine—remained constrained by durable elite networks with Russia; as opposed to countries with higher brokerage to the US-led order and lower integration into the Soviet legacy networks, which experienced more effective democratization pressures.

The theories are more certain about regime stability—Ukraine`s regime was likely to be unstable for both endogenous and exogenous reasons. Low and Middle-income democracies are prone to backsliding (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Structuralist accounts add that states subject to intense leverage from powerful neighbours—here Russia and the EU—face chronic instability (Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 2010; Hale, 2015; Jang, 2024).

In fact, during the last two decades, Ukraine has proven to be capable of both democratic and autocratic regimes, and unstable (D'Anieri, 2024). It was autocratic before

[1] With some shift towards the West a decade later.

2004, reached an unstable democracy then but experienced a backslide in 2010 to become autocratic for four more years, and then democratized again (Alizada *et al.*, 2022).

Thus, in these settings, the actors` choices are more decisive than everywhere else. Not only is the corridor for their choice not determined by structural limits, but also the historical moments when they get to choose – critical junctures (Collier and Collier, 2015) – happen several times in one generation.

Pacted transitions

Even in more structure-determined cases, the way an autocracy collapses is greatly connected with its perspectives for future democratization. The scholarship on modes of regime change suggests that a peaceful, cooperative regime change is the best way to achieve democracy, especially if it is driven by explicit negotiations. These pacted transitions can even lead to democratic results when the preconditions for democracy are not favourable (Colomer, 2000). Each of the known pacted transitions has led to a rapid improvement, and the vast majority of those have yielded stable democracies (Iakovlev, 2022).

The explanatory mechanisms behind this strong effect vary. More structure-inclined theories (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018) suggest that those regimes that can negotiate their exit have the characteristics (see below on preconditions) that are also very favorable for future democratization even if a transition is not cooperative. The purely agency-based approach argues that the pacts create a legacy that favors democratization (O'Donnell *et al.*, 1986; Huntington, 1993; Casper and Taylor, 1996; Munck and Leff, 1997; Przeworski, 1999; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Arnson, 2013). Such agreements (1) level the playing field by preventing a single actor from dominating it, provide the roadmap for the further transition, (2) exclude the radicals that might have anti-democratic traits, and help forestall violence.

In the situation of an autocratic breakdown, competing groups of elites and opposition are interdependent (O'Donnell *et al.*, 1986; Casper and Taylor, 1996; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Arnson, 2013, pp. 42–45). That is, the ruling elites do not know whether the regime will collapse if they try to disperse the protesters, and the opposition leaders do not know whether they will manage to take power by force. If elites and opposition do not attempt to do so and choose to negotiate, they can come up with a solution that is the second-best for every actor. Since politicians inherently strive for power, they are likely to negotiate a set of rules which does not allow any of them to dominate the playing field. Simply put, these agreements normally imply that both elites and opposition can still compete in free and fair elections. At the same time, the scope of those agreements can range from the mere terms of exit for the old elites to writing a constitution. Also, thanks to the formal character of those pacts, pacted transitions help make a written roadmap to follow.

Another advantage of the pacted transition is that it helps exclude radical forces on both sides. Since neither radical opposition nor hardliner elites have any common points to negotiate with their rivals, pacts are made by the moderates from both sides (Huntington, 1993; Przeworski, 1999). Less cooperative modes of regime change, instead, can give too much power to a single actor or social group that dominates a transition. In addition, if the incumbent regime collapses suddenly, it leaves a power vacuum and the absence of rules to follow. This causes a struggle within the opposition that can eventually bring radical forces to power. In contrast, having the guarantees offered by a formal agreement in mind, the actors involved in a pact are interested in mutual forbearance.

The theories give mixed signals about whether Ukrainian society was likely to undergo a successful pacted transition. Regimes that are (1) depersonalized, bureaucratized, (2) allow for pluralism within the elites, and (3) tolerate the existence of the opposition are more likely to negotiate pacts (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018).

The party-based and bureaucratized regimes leave elites more incentives to negotiate their exit than their personalized counterparts (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018). The presence of a party guarantees that incumbent elites will not be excluded from the new system. On the contrary, the transition might leave them a chance to win subsequent free and fair elections. Similarly, the bureaucratic apparatus from the old regime can also retain its privileges. Personalist dictators, in contrast, are unlikely to negotiate because they can be worried about post-exit punishments (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018, p. 213). It is also expected that the moderates from the government group should have some freedom to negotiate (Linz and Stepan, 1996). On the economic side, the society should be wealthy to negotiate a pact (*ibid.*), but at the same time, the economic growth should be stagnating, while the inequality is decreasing (Rosendorff, 2001). The moderate opposition needs some degree of continued achieved development to participate in pacts (O'Donnell *et al.*, 1986; Casper and Taylor, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 61; Colomer, 2000). Also, the democratic experience increases the chances of cooperative transitions (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018, p. 213).

Ukraine`s regime in 2004 was a competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky, Way, 2010: 213-220) and returned to that point in 2013. It shared the high level of personalization of power on one hand with the high levels of bureaucratization, decentralization, pluralism within the elites, and the existence of very strong parliamentary opposition. Thus, the personalization inhibited the chances of successful negotiations, while the second group of factors facilitated them. By 2013, it also had a democratic experience which thus increased the chances of a successful pacted transition. In addition, the civil society became much more developed and active by 2013 as opposed to 2004 (Zarembo and Martin, 2024).

In economic terms, Ukraine was, on one hand, far from being wealthy, thus decreasing its chances at pacted transition. On the other hand, its economy was growing

rampantly in 2004 and stagnating in 2013, while the levels of Gini indexes remained relatively low (*BTI 2024 Ukraine Country Report*, no date), thus giving elites the incentives to negotiate.

In short, Ukraine's regime hinges on agency; whether transitions are negotiated depends solely on actors' choices, not structures.

The strength of organizations

Party or movement strength rests on two often competing capacities: mobilizing people and mobilizing resources. I gauge party strength by electoral vote share and parliamentary seats, which convert popularity into money and staff (Tavits, 2008; Hale, 2015). Age matters: new protest waves draw crowds but lack structure, whereas older, institutionalized NGOs or parties trade some appeal for offices, cadres, and funds (Della Porta and Diani, 2011).

The literature on parties and social movements measures their strength with. The literature on political parties operationalizes both characteristics with votes earned during elections, this measure can be applied straightforwardly as popularity naturally transfers into available resources via the elections. Social movement scholars, in contrast, point out a trade-off between the two. The protest movements might not have any organizational form when they emerge, but after the initial wave fades, with time, they either disappear or turn into organizations – NGOs or parties. Those organizations might have less public support, but they normally have resources instead—cadres, offices, and money.

The number of people on the streets was overwhelming in both revolutions. However, in 2004, there exists no data whether the protesters were mobilized by the Orange Coalition or through their horizontal networks. The surveys suggest that in 2013, most of the people were brought onto the streets by friends and relatives (Onuch, 2014; Warkotsch, 2014, p. 176). In 2004, it is safe to say that almost all the resources were provided by the Orange Coalition. A decade later, three quarters of the resources originated from political parties,

whereas the rest was provided by the network of newborn bottom-up organizations. The following sections will demonstrate the resources available to the organizations of both Maidans.

Dependent variable – the success of negotiations

During the 2004 Orange Revolution, the negotiations and the following pact were successful, and a fragile electoral democracy followed. The pact, however, was signed by political leaders – Yanukovych, Yushchenko, and Kuchma alone, and was not supported by any stable grassroots civil society organization. What has then made the pacting easy turned out to be its caveat in the long run. After the parliamentary Orange Coalition collapsed, and one of the two antagonists lost office, there was no strong organization left that would be able to enforce this treaty. This eventually allowed Yanukovych to unilaterally dismiss it.

In 2014, the attempt at pacted transition failed because the opposition leaders who signed the agreement showed themselves unable to implement it. They neither convinced the protesters to return home, nor guaranteed the president his personal safety. Some extent of democratization followed despite the uncooperative character of the transition.

Independent variables: the organizational capacity of opposition – Ukraine 2004 and 2014.

The Orange Revolution in 2004 was more hierarchically organized than The Euromaidan in 2014 because the former was headed from above by the rival presidential candidate, whereas the latter originated spontaneously. First, the 2004 Orange Revolution was exclusively initiated and controlled by an alliance of three large parliamentary parties. Second, the Coalition was prepared long in advance to both pursue electoral competition and organize

post-electoral protests. In contrast, ten years later, the three opposition parties in Maidan`s organizational core were weaker: the largest party was beheaded, while the two others were small. In addition, no one expected Yanukovych to abort the Association Agreement with the EU at the very last moment, nor that this would cause massive outrage. Therefore, the parties joined Euromaidan late, after its protesters started to organize logistical support on their own. As the bottom-up organizations were mushrooming, the established parties became merely a part of this network (Way, 2014, p. 38). The two following sections describe the organizational structure in detail and elaborate on this argument.

The Organization Structure of Opposition in 2004

The Ukrainian 2004 protest was directed by a powerful umbrella alliance called the Orange Coalition: Our Ukraine, 23.6 % vote; 112 seats (Szajkowski, 2005, p. 603; Sagar, 2009, p. 597), Tymoshenko Bloc (7.3 %; 23), and Socialists (6.9 %; 20) (Sagar, 2009, pp. 597–603); commanded ~38 % of the 2002 vote and half the Rada; most of those parties were three years old.

The movement included NGOs mostly created in with Western funding. For instance, according to US official figures, the American spending on Ukrainian democracy promotion within the two years before the revolution was scoring as high as 58 million dollars (Brinkley, 2004). This funding went to the popular youth movement “Pora!”, (McFaul, 2007, p. 70); to the Freedom of Choice Coalition, the Committee of Ukrainian Voters and a Democratic Initiatives Foundation NGO that organized electoral monitoring (McFaul, 2007, pp. 58–59).

Although the media were largely controlled by the regime, the Fifth Chanel was loyal to rival Yushchenko and belonged to his ally Petro Poroshenko. The further the revolution went, the larger the audience of the independent media grew. Together with this trend, the mainstream media would become more and more independent (McFaul, 2007, pp. 61–62).

In 2004, the alliance of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko prepared not only to participate in elections but also to organize a protest in advance because they knew that the usage of electoral fraud was likely. The opposition leaders booked Maidan Nezalezhnosti square and set up[2] a stage, a screen, and speakers for a "music festival" to prepare for the possible protests (Wilson, 2005, p. 125). They managed to provide the public with places in the tents, free food, and live music even when a million showed up (Wilson, 2005, p. 126; McFaul, 2007).

The Organization Structure of Opposition in 2014

As Lucas Way (2014, p. 38) pointed out, "much of the organization behind the EuroMaidan emerged spontaneously *during* the crisis <…> the process involved a good deal of chaos". Its first formative weeks were self-organized: "as the Maidan drew more residents and visitors, its daily routine took on a self-organizing character" (2014, p. 86). The opposition parties joined at a certain point, but none of the mainstream politicians had any charismatic leadership among the protesters, and many of them were perceived as somewhat alien to the spontaneous movements. They, however, enjoyed a certain degree of control over what was the executive body of Maidan.

Similar to 2004, the organizational core of the protest was comprised of the alliance of three opposition parties that sought to unite against Yanukovych during the 2015 elections. The 2013-14 Euromaidan coalesced around a three-party electoral front heading into the 2015 race: Fatherland—25 % of the 2012 party-list vote, 101 seats, run by Arseniy Yatseniuk in Yulia Tymoshenko's absence; UDAR of Vitali Klitschko—13 %, 40 seats; and the nationalist Svoboda—10 %, 37 seats. Together they controlled roughly 40 % of the parliament,

[2] Opposition MPs had to install the stage using their hands, taking advantage of their immunity. (McFaul, 2007, p. 64)

financed square logistics and conferred moderate legitimacy that held radical wings in check. Protest-event data show far-right mobilisation peaking during this window, then collapsing as anti-Russian rhetoric was absorbed by mainstream actors—reflected in the snap 2014 poll, where Fatherland fell to 5.4 %, Svoboda to 1.7 %, and UDAR disappeared into Poroshenko's bloc (Gelashvili, 2023).

Euromaidan had its own centralized decision-making body (see Figure 1) called the Maidan Council[3], and had been summoned one month after Maidan started, on the 22nd of December (BBC, 2013). The Council was building on the alliance of political parties accompanied by the Maidan`s bottom-up leaders and had about 50 seats. As Arsen Avakov said in his interview, "you need to represent at least 100 people to be in the Council" (*Арсен Аваков в студії Hromadske.TV*, 2014). As Figure 1 demonstrates, the Council appointed the members of the Headquarters of National Resistance, commandants, and gave orders to the Headquarters. The Headquarters was somehow an executive body responsible both for street fights and for logistical support. Therefore, its commandants were divided between the Chief Commandant Andriy Parubiy, who was also a commander of the Self-Defense of Maidan, and those commandants responsible for logistics. A certain number of commandants represented opposition parties, while the others were elected directly.

The Self-Defense was organized in a fashion inspired by the Cossack armies. It comprised 42 *Sotnias*,[4] each of them having about 300 members rotating by shifts, among

[3] There were, however, numerous attempts at creating alternative bodies, each of them can be translated to English as Maidan Council: Рада Майдану, Громадяньска Рада Майдану, Громадяньский Сектор Майдану, Суспильна Рада Майдану. None of them, however, enjoyed any significant power. When I refer to The Maidan Council further in the text, I imply Рада Всеукраинского Объединения «Майдан».

[4] *Sotnia* can be translated from Ukrainian as hundred.

which, about 100 were constantly present. Most of the *sotnias* were independent units organized in a bottom-up, somewhat feudal way. According to Avakov, the Commander could not appoint or change the leader of *Sotnia* because he was elected directly by his crew (*Арсен Аваков в студії Hromadske.TV*, 2014). This, however, contradicts my interview with one of the field commanders of Maidan who assured me that *Sotniks* of the inner perimeter were dependent on political parties. Each *Sotnia* represented a certain political orientation or city and was subordinated to the Commander through its leader, *Sotnik*. *Sotnias* comprised of *Roi*, or Desiatok – i.e. 10 members that also enjoyed relative autonomy.

To make things even more decentralized, most of the *sotnias* of Maidan on the frontiers, outside of the main perimeters, were not subordinated to the commander and were independent of the entire system of Self-Defence. The 4 levels of barricades of the *Gruschevskogo* street were completely independent of the Maidan Council, and this would play a major role in attempts at negotiations (*Арсен Аваков в студії Hromadske.TV*, 2014). At a certain point, the opposition leaders were allegedly even ready for direct sabotage to get rid of the Grushevskogo street people. Yet, they sometimes coordinated their activity with the main Maidan commandment. *Sotnias* were not only in charge of street fights, but would also serve as the inner militia that would detect Yanukovych`s agents from the radical youth movement harassing the protesters – *titushki*, – to prevent kidnapping and maintain order. (Most of the information on the internal organization was retrieved from the interview of Arsen Avakov with Hromadanske TV (*Арсен Аваков в студії Hromadske.TV*, 2014).)

The main facilities of Maidan were organized around its buildings. Everybody present in Maidan could be fed: citizens donated fresh food that was later cooked by as many as 1500 activists during the peak times (Ponomarev *et al.*, 2018). The buildings had WiFi provided by companies DataTelecom and NetAssist (*ibid*). Those who volunteered for any of Maidan`s works could be housed. In routine times, about 500 people lived in tents, 2000 people in

occupied buildings, and the rest – in Kyiv residents' flats (*Арсен Аваков в студії Hromadske.TV*, 2014). The street fighters, members of *Sotnia*, could also receive ammunition collected through donations. Since the government started to arrest and kidnap from hospitals those injured on Maidan, it had to develop its own network of field hospitals called People`s Hospital (Ponomarev *et al.*, 2018). Maidan was surrounded by a perimeter of barricades, and the militia from Self-Defense would check any person entering Maidan to avoid drunk and homeless people (*ibid.*). The daily costs of Maidan were allegedly comprising $70,000 (most of which was spent on food, ammunition, electricity, and medicine), with about three-quarters of the budget coming from political parties from donations collected right in the square (*Арсен Аваков в студії Hromadske.TV*, 2014).

Since the EuroMaidan emerged in a bottom-up way, it was organized as a network. Although the Maidan Council had its own hierarchy, each of its functions was also executed by other grassroots organizations. These were coordinated with Maidan`s main bodies, but were by any means subordinated to the Council. Among them, AvtoMaidan, the organization of car owners who brought supplies to Maidan and committed car marches, was the most influential. It was created on the 30th of November 2013 (Hodkovskii and Kozlovskaya, 2014). EuromaidanSOS provided emergency support to the kidnapped and arrested activists. Logistical Headquarters comprised a hotline, while Dopomizhni Euromaidanu was helping with the supply of goods. There were also Transfer Euromaidanu, and many more (Wilson, 2014; Ponomarev *et al.*, 2018). Even the security functions were supplemented by many independent *sotnias* outside of the main perimeter. Needless to say, no one had veto powers over the whole totality of Euromaidan`s organizations.

Figure 1. Core hierarchy of the Euromaidan; dotted boxes denote autonomous groups – about here.

The processes leading to successful and failed negotiations

The story of the Ukrainian decade of instability started when Leonid Kuchma approached the end of his second term in Ukraine`s presidential office in 2003. He thus could not neither legally run for the next presidential elections, nor had power to break or override the law (Kuzio, 2005, p. 90). Thus, Kuchma tried to leave an heir, his prime minister during the last two years, Victor Yanukovych. While the reasons invoked for this choice vary (Zygar, 2015, p. 186), Yanukovych, it would be a challenge to get him elected, as he was known to have served three terms in prison[5] (Gorina, 2005; Leschenko, 2010).

The events of 2004.

Presidential elections were held in two rounds, on the 31st of October 2004, and the 21st of November 2004. In the first round, Yanukovych had to compete with several opposition candidates. He obtained only 39,3% of votes, while his rival Yushchenko had 40%. Before the electoral commission announced the results, both sides declared exit polls to be predicting their victory. The difference lies in methodologies – the pro-Yushchenko KMIS and Razumkov Centre used more anonymous survey techniques than the pro-governmental SOCIS, and thus predicted more votes for Yushchenko (McFaul, 2007, p. 60). The next day after the second round of elections, on the 22nd of November, the Electoral Commission announced the preliminary victory of Yanukovych, with 49,4% of votes against 46,7%.

Numerous electoral observers, NGOs, Ukrainian MPs, and Western officials declared the victory of Yanukovych to be electoral fraud. Apart from electoral fraud, Yanukovych was

[5] Also, he had been educated as a car mechanic, and only had a low-quality distance learning higher education at the age of 30, which was impossible to hide in his public appearance.

also blamed for an attempt to poison his opponent Yushchenko before the elections on the 5th of September 2004 (*RBC*, 2005b). At the same time, Russia, together with some CIS countries, congratulated Yanukovych on his victory even before the official results were announced.

The stalemate led to an unprecedented level of protest mobilization in the capital of Ukraine with as many as one million and a half people on the 27th of November (Kuzio 2005, 93; McFaul 2007, 65).

Support for Kuchma and Yanukovych collapsed as the Orange Revolution grew: the People's Democratic Party and Kinakh's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs defected to Yushchenko (Kuzio, 2005, p. 35), and journalists at once-compliant TV channels broke ranks (McFaul, 2007, p. 63). By 25 November the SBU pledged to shield protesters (*Ukrainska Pravda*, 2005), the Supreme Court froze the vote tally (*RBC*, 2005a), and Kyiv's mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko poured city resources—food, water, sanitation—into the square (McFaul, 2007, p. 65)

These shifts made Yushchenko and Yanukovych interdependent by the 25th of November, and neither of them could unilaterally impose their decision on the other. In other words, the contention ended up in what is understood as a classical situation of pacting (Rustow, 1970; O'Donnell *et al.*, 1986).

Time break of negotiations in Ukraine 2004.

The talks over the electoral crisis started almost immediately after the protests erupted, on the 26th of November in the Mariinski Palace (see Table 1 for participants) (Wilson, 2005, p. 139). The first session did not yield any compromise.

Although no violence ever erupted, its threat always remained acute during the following week – from both sides. When the negotiations began, the Orange protesters already besieged several government buildings and prevented state officials from entering. After the failure of the first round of negotiations, Tymoshenko, together with the radical wings of the Pora movement, carried out a plan of seizing the building by force. Yushchenko, however, had enough authority to prevent them from doing so (McFaul, 2007, p. 65). On the side of the elites, president Kuchma had to leave office anyway, and he did not want to take personal responsibility for repression. At the same time, violence was always in the air: the idea of lifting the state of emergency and repressing the protest was supported by the emergency session of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (Kuzio, 2015, p. 74). More than that, Putin in his talks with Kuchma was always advocating for a coercive solution. At a certain point, Yanukovych tried to unilaterally order the police to disperse Maidan, and the police were tamed by the SBU, who were allegedly acting with a direct Kuchma order (Wilson, 2005, p. 137).

The main successful round of negotiations took place on the 1st of December (see Table 1 for participants). As Kudelia argues, "[Kuchma] saw the solution in adopting the political reform, while Yushchenko insisted on changing the election law to prevent further fraud during the third round of elections" (2007, p. 96). The "political reform" in this case meant a transformation into a parliamentary republic that would guarantee the pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority some remnants of his political power for two more years.

Some demands never worked and even put negotiations at risk. The opposition demanded Yanukovych be dismissed as prime minister (officially, he was on vacation) paired with the dismissal of the government, which almost ruined the whole round of talks (Kudelia, 2007, p. 96). Yushchenko was also risking making a mistake almost promising to disperse the crowds immediately (Wilson, 2005, p. 140).

The last round on the 7th of December was rather the re-negotiation of the earlier terms after the Supreme Court took Yushchenko`s side. It mostly fixed guarantees on the vital interests of the leaving elites. The secret part of the final agreement allegedly guaranteed Kuchma and Yanukovych not to be punished, which echoes with Kuchma`s appointee Sviatoslav Piskun taking the office of the chief prosecutor (Kudelia, 2007, p. 100). As a result, the regime was forced to produce the third round of elections that was well-controlled by electoral observers, and Yushchenko won with 52% against 44%.

It was always organizations and institutions that prevented single actors from escalating the conflict. In the opposition camp, it was the Orange Coalition that first tamed Tymoshenko, and then it was "Our Ukraine" that tamed Yushchenko. Then, it was the Ukrainian institutions that made Kuchma leave office anyway which made repression useless for him, and then, paradoxically, it was the Ukrainian secret service that stopped Yanukovych from repression.

Despite being at risk many times, the final agreement was very much a *locus classicus* of a pacted transition. It excluded radicals, ensured a roadmap for a peaceful solution to a crisis, and exchanged power (which here takes the form of the "electoral reform") for the vital interests of Kuchma, while agreeing on the new rules of the game, namely on a new 2004 parliamentary constitution.

Table 1. The participants of the negotiations in Ukraine on the 26th of November, the 1st, and the 7th of December 2004[6]. – about here.

Backslide of 2010

The rule of the Orange Coalition of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, a lucky chance for

[6] Source: Kudelia, 2007, 95.

Ukraine it would appear at first glance, did not go as smoothly as it started. The alliance fell apart in less than a year, (112 ua, 2016) and Tymoshenko was removed from her position as prime minister. Yushchenko`s health was undermined by dioxide, and he was spending much time in hospitals, devoting little time to his duties. Neither did the Orange government become more "pro-Western" or "anti-Russian", instead, it shared tremendous corruption schemes with Moscow (Wilson, 2014, p. 46).

Yanukovych did not disappear from Ukraine`s political landscape, as the split of the Orange coalition allowed him to seize power. The parties of what used to be the Orange coalition won the 2006 parliamentary elections. However, Tymoshenko`s party surprisingly allied with the party of Yanukovych, which brought him to the prime minister`s office. In 2010, he won the presidential elections.

Yanukovych`s coming to power in 2010 resulted in what Bermeo (2016) calls executive aggrandizement. First, he managed to bribe just enough parliament members to have a majority. Later, he captured the constitutional court, which is known to be the key turning point in autocratizations (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Sato *et al.*, 2022). Then he got rid of his political opponents starting by putting Tymoshenko in jail and proceeding with arresting dozens of her state officials (Wilson, 2014, p. 51). Thus, by 2013, the regime once again returned to competitive authoritarianism. Not only this undermined institutions but also narrowed the space for regime compromise, ultimately pushing towards a revolutionary rather than negotiated regime shift (Ekman, 2024).

Events of 2014

By the end of 2013, the Association Agreement the EU seemed to be signed shortly, while Yanukovych turned this issue into his presidential campaign. During the whole year, his TV

channels were advertising the Association as the main accomplishment of his presidential term. Trying to prevent Ukraine from signing the agreement, Russia practically banned trade with Ukraine, which constituted a major part of its income (Ulianova, 2013; Welle, 2013), while Yanukovych was forced to negotiate with Putin. A week before the agreement was to be signed at the Vilnius Summit, on the 23rd of November, Yanukovych cancelled the deal (Stepovik, 2013).

Spontaneous insignificant protests started immediately, yet they were not supported by the political parties (Wilson, 2014, p. 65). Yanukovych attempted for the first time to violently disperse the small-scale student rally on the 30th of November 2013 – and this provoked a reaction anyone could hardly anticipate or stop. Radicalized protesters built barricades and occupied governmental buildings: the Kiyv Administration building and Dom Profsoiuzov on the 1st of December, and the October Palace on the 2nd of December (Ponomarev *et al.*, 2018). Only a week later, most of the Ukrainian opposition parties started to join the movement. By the 8th of December 2013, the protesters aspired to gather as many as one million participants (Wilson, 2014, p. 73). Yet another massive attempt to disperse the protest with police forces on the 11th of December failed. From then, the stalemate lasted for two months with the number of people on the streets fading. The parliament opposition did not manage to dissolve the government.

On the 16th of January, Yanukovych passed the so-called "dictatorial laws" that would ban and criminalize most of the protest activity in Ukraine (Sakwa, 2015, p. 262). The reform provoked a massive public outburst and violent clashes on Hruschevsky street near the Maidan. By the 23rd of January 2014, not only did the protesters occupy more of the governmental buildings,[7] but they also took control of some of the Western regions.

[7] Namely – "Kiyv" TV Chanel building on 21st of January 2014, Parliamentary library on 22nd of January 2014, on 24th of January – Agrarian Ministry building; on 26th of January – Ukrainian House; and some more the19th of February 19 (Ponomarev *et al.*, 2018)

Throughout the whole of February, the parliamentary opposition leaders Yatsenyuk, Tyahnybok, and Klychko tried to negotiate a pact with Yanukovych. Every attempt at these negotiations failed: "Every time an agreement was signed between the parliamentary parties and the president, the protesters ignored it or put on a show of force to demonstrate that they were not consulted" (Wilson, 2014, p. 86). Sometimes, protesters were even violent to opposition leaders (Krapfl and Kühn Von Burgsdorff, 2023, p. 328).

In addition, the situation was complicated by a stalemate between the independent *sotnia*s fighting on Grushevskogo street and the opposition leaders. The opposition political leaders would like to retain the monopoly on volence in the Maidan. Peace agreements made between the leaders of a veteran organization and the Right Sector with the leaders of the SBU made in early February included giving up Grushevskogo street in exchange for releasing political prisoners (Ukrainska Pravda, no date).

On the 18th of February 2014, the opposition organized a march from Maidan towards the government building to demand the resignation of the government and the return of the 2004 constitution. Maidan forces, armed with shields and firebombs, went beyond the barricades and assaulted the governmental buildings. The protesters managed to capture several buildings on Institutskaya Street but then had to retreat (Wilson, 2014, p. 87). The clashes between the police and the protesters left three dozen people dead (Sakwa, 2015, p. 279). The contention of street fights escalated, with many protesters being killed. The government responded with its most serious attempt to clear the streets called "Operation Boomerang" together with "Operation Surge" the same evening. It failed, leaving more than two dozen people dead (*ibid.*) and Dom Profsoiuzov, the logistical heart of Maidan, being burned down.

The massacre happened the next day, the 19th of February. A group of unknown snipers started to shoot both at the riot police and the protesters provoking a massive

gunfight. Since EuroMaidan had already captured control over several regions to the West, it was armed, and so was Berkut, the riot police. Both sides started to use firearms, as they thought, in response. The riot police started to retreat, and the protesters took control of some of the governmental buildings. The same night, the parliament forbade riot police to use force against protesters, and the conflict froze leaving several hundred protesters dead.

Time break of negotiations in 2014

Right after the massacre, Ukrainian politicians started to prepare the most serious round of negotiations. The EU representatives arrived in Kiyv on the same night (see names and affiliations of participants in Table 2). They started preliminary talks with Yanukovych right in the morning of the 20th of February (Wilson, 2014). The official negotiations started when the representatives of Russia arrived on the 21st of February, 01:20 (*ibid*.). Fabius left negotiations the same night before the agreement was reached. The original version of the pact was prepared by the main pool of participants at 07:20 (Potocki and Parafianowicz, 2014; Wilson, 2014).

The three party leaders used all the organizational capacities of Euromaidan. Later, after the first agreement was reached at 7 am, Yatsenyuk, Klychko, and Tyahnybok, accompanied by Western foreign ministers, consulted the Council of Euromaidan, which almost unilaterally supported the agreement(Potocki and Parafianowicz, 2014). It took Sikorski a great deal to convince members of the Maidan Council that violent repression was likely should they reject the pact. After that, the pact was signed officially, according to different sources, on the 21st of February at 16:00 (Sakwa, 2015, p. 277), at 18:00 (*Grani*, 2014), or at 18:45 (Wilson, 2014, p. 91). Later in the evening of the 21st of February, following the agreement, police forces withdrew from the streets (Wilson, 2014, p. 91).

Table 2. The participants of the negotiations in Ukraine from the 20th of February evening to 18:45 on the 21st of February[8] -- about here.

`.

[8] In this table, I only cited sources for the names that are not present everywhere in the literature, therefore, there is a potential contradiction. The other names are mentioned everywhere in the literature and press. With time estimation, I chose the longest estimate offered by Wilson (2014, p. 91).

Yanukovych did not have to resign immediately and could even participate in the presidential elections 9 months later. Protesters had to leave the streets and give up firearms, but the same applied to the riot police. In exchange, the old 2004 parliamentary constitution was to be implemented within 2 days, thus leaving Yanukovych with mostly formal powers. The new "national unity" government had to be formed within 12 days, and a new constitution that would "balance presidential and parliamentary powers" was to be drafted before September 2014, presidential elections were to be held immediately after that but no later than December 2014 with the new independent electoral commission[9] (TVI, 2014; Sakwa, 2015).

The attempted agreement involved a great deal of compromise. For the opposition leaders, it was risky to leave Yanukovitch in office, even if stripped of formal powers, while withdrawing from the streets. For Yanukovych, it was also risky to give in most of his power when the opposition leaders did not have a monopoly over violence in Maidan.

The same evening, at 21:36 the 21st of February, Klychko made a speech to Euromaidan[10] (*Ukraine 112*, 2014). He showed up during the funeral procession of those who were killed two days before, right at the moment when the crowd was carrying the coffins. As a result, the protesters angrily booed Klychko. After that, the footages show a *Sotnia* leader Volodymyr Parasyuk breaking his way to the stage and snatching the microphone from Klychko`s hands (*На Майдані поставили ультиматум Януковичу до 10 ранку - Yanukovich given a 10 am ultimatium*, 2014; *Якщо не буде вимоги відставки, ми підем на штурм — сотник*, 2014). He said that, first, he finds it immoral to negotiate "with the criminals", and that the only thing they delegated to politicians was to make Yanukovych

[9] The text of the pact was deleted from all Ukrainian official websites in March 2014 (Borisov, 2018, p. 494).

[10] Richard Sakwa on page 279 claims that the three leaders made a speech together but in fact Yatsenyuk and Tyahnybok were standing somewhere in the background of the stage.

resign, and they failed this task. Second, he gave an ultimatum that if politicians did not demand Yanukovych resign immediately, "they" were going to capture governmental buildings by force[11]. His speech was cheered enthusiastically by the crowd. After that Klychko and others started to excuse unconvincingly for shaking hands and said that it was impossible to drive Yanukovych out. Further that night, those calling for forbearance were always booed, the escalation was cheered.

Many Maidan groups had rejected the EU-brokered pact even before it was read aloud. AvtoMaidan demanded Yanukovych's resignation by 19:00 (Hadzhynov, 2014a, 2014b), and at 20:55 Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh urged an armed struggle. Neither the Maidan Council nor the opposition Troika would have been able to tame all the protests with the conditions of the pact they had signed.

The widespread discourse in the literature suggests that Yanukovych fled after the speech by Parasyuk (Wilson, 2014, p. 280; Sakwa, 2015, p. 280), but the evidence suggests a different sequence. The time code on the leaked footings from Yanukovych`s CCTV cameras shows him leaving the building of his residence in Kiyv at 21:24, ten minutes *before* Klychko was booed and Parasyuk spoke (*21 февраля 2014, Майдан. Антология событий*, 2017). Moreover, the same video shows his staff carrying a painting toward a lorry around 15:24, even before the pact was demonstrated to the Maidan Council.

Yanukovych flew to Kharkiv to rally eastern elites, failed, and on 22 February 2014 was removed by an irregular but near-unanimous parliamentary vote (Wilson, 2014, p. 93). He moved through Crimea to Rostov-on-Don, still claiming the presidency.

Each camp accuses the other of breaking the pact. Yanukovych himself says that he was surprised that after having an agreement with such a high-level mediators "they [the

[11] Later during his speech, he says that if Yanukovych does not resign before 10:00 22nd of February "they" are going to capture governmental buildings.

opposition] played [him] for a sucker"[12] (Frolyak 2017), and began to seize state buildings; Moscow cites this "coup" to deny Ukraine's territorial integrity. Yet Yanukovych fled earlier, and occupations began only after his departure. Moreover, the Troika could not command every autonomous *sotnia*, so their ability to honor the pact remains untested. The pro-opposition position (Potocki and Parafianowicz, 2014; Wilson, 2014) argues that most of the organizational capacities of Maidan including the three parliamentary parties and the Maidan Council supported the deal and sent Klychko to announce it to the protesters. The mere reaction of the crowd and the antagonism of radical organizations and *sotnias* does not mean that the main body of Maidan and most of its Self-Defence would defect. This view underplays why Yanukovych bolted: escalating violence, uncontrollable armed units, elite defections, and at least four alleged assassination attempts (Sakwa, 2015, p. 211) made it clear that "his life was in danger" (Sakwa, 2015, p. 211). By the 21 February pact, riot police were surrendering and had left Kyiv's streets by about 15:00—whether because Yanukovych honored the deal or due to elite defections is unclear (Wilson, 2014, p. 92)—yet he still had Alpha special forces, 200 bodyguards, loyal *titushki*, and incoming riot-police reinforcements to protect him (Wilson, 2014, p. 93).

The problem with both positions is that they are seeking the reason in the actions of actors, whereas it comes from the structure. The two sides made every step possible to achieve a negotiated solution for this crisis. The Troika tried to calm the decentralized protests, while the government withdrew the police forces from the streets.

Conclusion

Both crises involved the same actors, yet only 2004 produced a pact. In both cases, the parties were at the heart of Maidan`s organizational basis and financed most of the supplies. The

[12] My translation from Russian "Меня кинули как лоха!"

direction of Russian influence and the one of the EU were the same in these two cases. In both cases, the number of people on the streets was shocking, reaching almost half of the population of Kiyv. Numerous failed attempts at negotiations preceded the final round. What is more, the negotiation rooms were packed with high-level EU representatives, whereas the Russian presence in the negotiations was rather a formality. In both cases, Russia attempted to command directly the Ukrainian leaders to forcefully dissipate protests.

There are, however, many differences in the processes and organizations that eventually led to the successful pact in 2004 and the collapse of negotiations in 2014. As opposed to the 2014, the 2004 Round Table involved a mediator figure -- president Kuchma who was going to leave his office anyway. In 2004, both elites and the opposition behaved non-violently, whereas, in 2014, Yanukovych tried to disperse the protesters with force from the first days, thus radicalizing them. Euromaidan 2014 movement had way more decentralized character than one decade before. First, Maidan 2004 was prepared long in advance, because the opposition Orange Coalition knew that Yanukovych would rely on fraud. Hence, the protest movement had a hierarchical structure, was well-organized and centralized. In contrast, Euromaidan 2014 was caused by a series of mistakes made by Yanukovych, and therefore, came as a surprise for the political parties who joined late. Additionally, the Orange Coalition umbrella alliance of 2004 itself was extremely strong and supported by the bulk of political and economic elites. The party alliance of 2014, on the contrary, was weakened and beheaded after the democratic backslide of 2010-2013. As a result, in 2014, many logistical functions were taken by bottom-up organizations because parties were not fast and strong enough to take the initiative. Hence, these organizations were rather cooperating with- than subordinated to- the main party-based body of the movement. On top of that, the structure of the Self-Defense of Maidan was decentralized: many of its fighting units, *sotnias*, were summoned in their regions of origin and were subordinated rather to their commander than to

the commander of Euromaidan. Likewise, the three *sotnia*s outside of the main perimeter that participated in the most heated struggles openly did not subordinate to Maidan`s Self-Defense. On top of that, Maidan 2004 was only organized in the capital and therefore was easier to control. Similar movements in 2014 were sparkling in a bottom-up way in almost any significant Ukrainian city, not subordinated to everyone.

It is surprising how much the pair of Ukrainian cases have played according to the scenario predicted by the literature on pacted transitions from the early Third Wave of democratization. To begin with, in both cases, the decisive rounds of negotiations started only when the elites and opposition became interdependent, whereas, before that, the attempted talks did not appear serious enough. In 2004, it was the avalanche of elite defections that brought the sides to the round table. In 2014, the surging level of violence urged sides to seek a compromise. Second, the forces radical enough to consider a violent solution always refrained from pacting. Tymoshenko opted for capturing the government buildings and did not participate in the negotiations of 2004. In 2014, Parubiy was in charge of the street fights and refused to negotiate with Yanikovych. The same applies to organizations favoring the radical street action such as the Right Sector or even the Avtomaidan. Even the Russian representatives that advocated for the forceful dissipation of both revolutions, were reluctant when it came to participation in negotiations.

The preconditions for a successful pacted transition also worked in the predicted way. Deperconalization and bureaucratization of the political regime pushed towards the cooperative solution. In 2004, it was the power-sharing between Kuchma and Yanukovych in the beginning, and the secret service later that prevented the state violence. At the same time, the intra-elite pluralism allowed for the elite defections and compelled Yanukovych and Kuchma to negotiate.

On the opposition side, depersonalized and bureaucratized hierarchical structures, that are, established organizations as opposed to the newborn movement, and hierarchical alliances as opposed to networks also pushed for the negotiations. The huge umbrella alliance of political parties and establihed NGOs tamed the aspirations for violent actions both from Tymoshenko when she desired to capture the government buildings and of Yushchenko when he tried to cancel the deal with Kuchma on the 8th of December 2004. On the opposite, one of the key reasons for the failure of the attempts at negotiations in 2014 was weakened and fragmented party system allied with a network of many newborn movements. Within the entire movement, it was also established parties - Fatherland, UDAR, Freedom, and the hierarchical, depersonalized collective structures organized with their help - Maidan Council and Maidan Self-Defence, that were able to propel the idea of negotiations and promote the results of the pact. At the same time, these established party structures lacked public support compared to the flashy bottom-up movements - which, as I have shown in the theory part, is a natural process. The latter - the independent *Sotnia* fighters, the newborn movements such as Avtomaidam, to say nothing of the militant Right Sector, fiercely opposed the idea of negotiations. With this backdrop, the three party leaders could not demonstrate to Yanukovych that he would be safe once he stepped down - even though they did their best.

Bibliography

21 февраля 2014, Майдан. Антология событий (2017). (https://www.youtube.com/user/FaktyICTV). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmnDsRP5_sY (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

112 ua (2016) 'Ющенко рассказал, как в 2005 г. закрыл в кабинете Порошенко и Тимошенко, чтобы решить политический кризис', *112 ua*, 19 February. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20160222215010/https://112.ua/politika/yushhenko-rasskazal-kak-v-2005-zakryl-v-kabinete-poroshenko-i-timoshenko-chtoby-reshit-politicheskiy-krizis-293071.html (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Alizada, N. *et al.* (2022) *Democracy Report 2022: Autocratization Changing Nature?* Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem).

BBC (2013) 'Киев: оппозиция создала Народное объединение Майдан', *BBC News Русская служба*. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2013/12/131222_ukraine_kiev_maidan (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Bermeo, N. (2016) 'On Democratic Backsliding', *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), pp. 5–19. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012.

Boix, C. (2011) 'Democracy, Development, and the International System', *American Political Science Review*, 105(4), pp. 809–828. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000402.

Boix, C. and Stokes, S.C. (2003) 'Endogenous Democratization', *World Politics*, 55(4), pp. 517–549.

Borisov, N. (2018) *Президентство на постсоветском пространстве: процессы генезиса и трансформаций*. ЛитРес. Available at: https://books.google.ru/books?id=z5N9DwAAQBAJ.

Brinkley, J. (2004) 'Dollars for Democracy?: U.S. Aid to Ukraine Challenged', *The New York Times*, 21 December. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/21/politics/dollars-for-democracy-us-aid-to-ukraine-challenged.html (Accessed: 7 August 2020).

BTI 2024 Ukraine Country Report (no date) *BTI 2024*. Available at: https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report?isocode=UKR&cHash=69f996b67acbacecaca1722b9a3cc4b5 (Accessed: 27 May 2025).

Casper, G. and Taylor, M.M. (1996) *Negotiating democracy: Transitions from authoritarian rule*. University of Pittsburgh Pre.

Collier, R.B. and Collier, D. (2015) 'Critical junctures and historical legacies', in *Shaping the Political Arena*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Colomer, J.M. (2000) *Strategic transitions: Game theory and democratization*. Johns Hopkins University.

D'Anieri, P. (2024) 'Elections, Succession, and Legitimacy in Ukraine', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 57(4), pp. 6–27. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2023.2001608.

Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2011) *Social movements: an introduction*. 2. ed., [Nachdr.]. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.

Diuk, N. (2014) 'Finding Ukraine', *Journal of Democracy*, 25(3), pp. 83–89. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0041.

Ekman, P. (2024) 'Painful Moments and Realignment: Explaining Ukraine's Foreign Policy, 2014–2022', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 71(3), pp. 232–244. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2023.2253358.

Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E. (2018) *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*. 1st edn. Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316336182.

Gelashvili, T. (2023) 'Political Opportunities and Mobilisation on the Far-Right in Ukraine', *East European Politics*, 40(2), pp. 277–298.

Gorina, I. (2005) *Судимости Януковича не сняты*, *Российская газета*. Available at: https://rg.ru/2005/07/13/yanukovich.html (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Grani (2014) *Grani RU*. Available at: https://graniru.org/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.224872.html (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Hadzhynov, S. (2014a) 'AUTOMAIDAN : Заява Автомайдану | Facebook'. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/groups/AUTOMAIDAN/permalink/548279121936740/ (Accessed: 15 April 2021).

Hadzhynov, S. (2014b) 'Автомайдан: Не воспринимаем ничего, кроме отставки Януковича'.

Hale, H.E. (2015) *Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (Problems of international politics).

Hodkovskii, K. and Kozlovskaya, L. (2014) *Автомайдан: история, деятельность, феномен.* Warsaw: Open Dialog Foundation, p. 28. Available at: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:U3h4O9t9EfcJ:https://ru.odfoundation.eu/i/fmfiles/raporty/yd0303142-report-on-automaidan-ru.pdf%3Fdownload+&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ru (Accessed: 26 May 2014).

Huntington, S.P. (1993) *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. University of Oklahoma press.

Iakovlev, G. (2022) 'Preconditions for pacted transitions from authoritarian rule', *European Political Science Review*, pp. 1–18. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773922000273.

Inglehart, R. (2018) *Cultural evolution: people's motivations are changing, and reshaping the world*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press (American political thought).

Jang, W. (2024) 'The contestation of international ties and regime transitions: evidence from the former Soviet republics', *Democratization*, 31(1), pp. 233–257. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2262939.

Krapfl, J. and Kühn Von Burgsdorff, E. (2023) 'Ukraine's Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity, ten years later', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 65(3–4), pp. 325–334. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2023.2293420.

Kudelia, S. (2007) 'Revolutionary bargain: The unmaking of Ukraine's autocracy through pacting', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 23(1), pp. 77–100.

Kudelia, S. and others (2013) 'Choosing violence in irregular wars: the case of anti-soviet insurgency in western Ukraine', *East European Politics and Societies*, 27(01), pp. 149–181.

Kuzio, T. (2005) 'From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 52(2), pp. 29–44.

Kuzio, T. (2015) *Ukraine: democratization, corruption, and the new Russian imperialism*. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Security International.

Leschenko, S. (2010) *Как отменили судимости Януковича. Документы публикуются впервые*, *Украинская правда*. Available at: http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2010/01/14/4618441/ (Accessed: 9 April 2021).

Levitsky, S. and Way, Lucan A (2010) *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, S. and Way, Lucan A. (2010) *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781353.

Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. (2018) *How democracies die*. Broadway Books.

Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. (1996) *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. JHU Press.

Lipset, S.M. (1959) 'Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy', *American political science review*, 53(1), pp. 69–105.

McFaul, M. (2007) 'Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution', *International Security*, 32(2), pp. 45–83. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.45.

Munck, G.L. and Leff, C.S. (1997) 'Modes of transition and democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in comparative perspective', *Comparative Politics*, pp. 343–362.

O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P.C. and Arnson, C.J. (2013) *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*. JHU Press.

O'Donnell, G.A. *et al.* (1986) *Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*. Reissue. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (Transitions from authoritarian rule, edited by Guillermo O'Donell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead ; 4th volume).

Onuch, O. (2014) 'Who Were the Protesters?', *Journal of Democracy*, 25(3), pp. 44–51. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0045.

Ponomarev, N.A. *et al.* (2018) 'Organization of the infrastructure pf the protest actipons (case study of Euromaidan)', *Вестник Пермского университета. Политология*, (2), pp. 91–105. Available at: https://doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2018-2-91-105.

Potocki, M. and Parafianowicz, Z. (2014) 'To on usłyszał od Sikorskiego: podpiszecie porozumienie albo zginiecie. Ołeksij Harań ujawnia kulisy negocjacji ws. Ukrainy'. Available at: https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/783959,sikorski-nie-musi-przepraszac-za-ostre-slowa-na-ukrainie-wywiad-z-oleksijem-haraniem.html (Accessed: 13 April 2021).

Przeworski, A. (1999) *Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (Studies in rationality and social change).

Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1997) 'Modernization: Theories and Facts', *World Politics*, 49(2), pp. 155–183.

Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R.Y. (1994) *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton university press.

RBC (2005a) 'ВС Украины запретил ЦИК публиковать результаты выборов'. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/25/11/2004/5703b68a9a7947783a5a5de2 (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

RBC (2005b) 'В.Ющенко: Меня отравили люди Л.Кучмы'. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/society/01/04/2005/5703c4309a7947dde8e0bfe8 (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Rosendorff, B.P. (2001) 'Choosing democracy', *Economics & Politics*, 13(1), pp. 1–29.

Rustow, D.A. (1970) 'Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model', *Comparative politics*, 2(3), pp. 337–363.

Sagar, D.J. (ed.) (2009) *Political parties of the world*. 7. ed. London: Harper.

Sakwa, R. (2015) *Frontline Ukraine: crisis in the borderlands*. London ; New York: I.B. Tauris.

Sato, Y. *et al.* (2022) 'Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization'. Rochester, NY. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4239798.

Stepovik, M. (2013) 'Украина приостановила подготовку к подписанию соглашения об ассоциации с ЕС | Новости из Германии об Украине | DW |', 21 November. Available at: https://www.dw.com/ru/украина-приостановила-подготовку-к-подписанию-соглашения-об-ассоциации-с-ес/a-17244002 (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Szajkowski, B. (ed.) (2005) *Political parties of the world*. 6th. ed. London: John Harper.

Tavits, M. (2008) 'Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(1), pp. 113–133.

TVI (2014) *Полный текст Соглашения оппозиции и Януковича*, *TVI*. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140322013009/http:/ru.tvi.ua/new/2014/02/21/polnyj_tekst_soglasheniya_oppozicii_i_yanukovicha (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Ukraine 112 (2014). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zc1jgWrr4o4 (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Ukrainska Pravda (2005) 'ГЛАВА СБУ СПАС РЕВОЛЮЦИЮ ОТ КРОВОПРОЛИТИЯ - "The New York Times"'. Available at: http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/01/17/4384814/ (Accessed: 9 April 2021).

Ukrainska Pravda (no date) *Афганцы утверждают, что договорились с силовиками об освобождении активистов*, *Ukrainska Pravda*. Available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/02/3/7012481/ (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

Ulianova, J. (2013) 'Принуждение к братской дружбе', *Газета.Ru*. Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/08/19_a_5597565.shtml (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Vanhanen, T. (2003) *Democratization a comparative analysis of 170 countries*. London: Routledge. Available at: http://www.myilibrary.com?id=2437 (Accessed: 10 March 2018).

Warkotsch, J. (2014) *Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity: The Political Economy of Protest Mobilization in Egypt and Tunisia*. European University Institute.

Way, L. (2014) 'Civil Society and Democratization', *Journal of Democracy*, 25(3), pp. 35–43. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0042.

Welle, D. (2013) 'В чем причины срыва соглашения об ассоциации между Украиной и ЕС | DW | 23.11.2013', *DW.COM*. Available at: https://www.dw.com/ru/в-чем-причины-срыва-соглашения-об-ассоциации-между-украиной-и-ес/a-17246582 (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

Wilson, A. (2005) *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press.

Wilson, A. (2014) *Ukraine crisis: what it means for the West*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zarembo, K. and Martin, E. (2024) 'Civil society and sense of community in Ukraine: from dormancy to action', *European Societies*, 26(2), pp. 203–229. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2185652.

Zelinska, O. (2023) 'Influential allies and grassroots movement mobilization: Ukraine's Maidan, 2013–2014', *International Sociology*, 38(3), pp. 334–352. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/02685809231166575.

Zygar, M. (2015) *Вся кремлевская рать. Краткая история современной России*. Litres.

Арсен Аваков в студії Hromadske.TV (2014). Kiev: Hromadske.TV. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5BKLSDkIJQ#t=1049 (Accessed: 18 June 2020).

На Майдані поставили ультиматум Януковичу до 10 ранку - Yanukovich given a 10 am ultimatium (2014). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eU5Bx3IrgRk&ab_channel=Espreso.TV (Accessed: 15 April 2021).

Якщо не буде вимоги відставки, ми підем на штурм — сотник (2014). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ys0FDfXQak&ab_channel=hromadske (Accessed: 15 April 2021).

Figure 1. Core hierarchy of the Euromaidan; dotted boxes denote autonomous groups.



Table 1. The participants of the negotiations in Ukraine on the 26th of November, the 1st, and the 7th of December 2004[1].

Ruler	Opposition	Russia	EU
Leonid Kuchma, the President of Ukraine	Victor Yushchenko, the rival presidential candidate, the leader of Our Ukraine party and the Orange Coalition, ex-prime minister (1999-2001)	Boris Gryzlov, the speaker of the Russian Duma.	Alexander Kwasniewski, the president of Poland;
Victor Yanukovych, the Presidential candidate, prime minister of Ukraine		Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, who was not physically present but allegedly rang several times[2]	Valdas Adamkus, the president of Lithuania,
Vladimir Litvin, the Speaker of the Parliament			Javier Solana, the European Union high representative for the common foreign and security policy Jan Kubish, the secretary-general of the OSCE

[1] Source: Kudelia, 2007, 95.

[2] Source: Wislon, 2005, 140.

Table 2. The participants of the negotiations in Ukraine from the 20th of February evening to 18:45 on the 21st of February [1]

Ruler	Opposition	Russia	EU
Victor Yanukovych, the President of Ukraine	Arseniy Yatsenyuk (AUUF or Batkivshchyna), later achieved 5,4% of votes	Vladimir Lukin, ex-ombudsman (did not sign the pact claiming that he does not know whether Yanukovych is still actually in power)	Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andrey Kluev, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine	Vitali Klychko, UDAR, 10 thousand members and later achieved 13% of votes within a big alliance	Mikhail Zurabov, Russian Ambassador to Ukraine. Left negotiations earlier "at night" (Wilson).	Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andrey Portnov, president`s adviser	Oleg Tiagnibok (AUUS, or Svoboda) had 20 thousand members and later achieved 1,7% of votes.[2]		Laurent Fabius[3], French Minister of Foreign Affairs, "left later" (Wilson).

[1] In this table, I only cited sources for the names that are not present everywhere in the literature, therefore, there is a potential contradiction. The other names are mentioned everywhere in the literature and press. With time estimation, I chose the longest estimate offered by Wilson (2014, p. 91).

[3] Fabius is only mentioned by Wilson.

Eric Fournier, Director at the Continental Europe Department of the French Foreign Ministry. Left negotiations earlier at night, probably simultaneously with Zurabov (Sakwa, UNIAN).